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26 January 1956

1. Problem:

To identify the problems associated with the production of national intelligence in wartime.

2. Assumptions:

- a. Operation of the IAC mechanism for national intelligence production will be speeded up in wartime.
- b. The NSC's wartime function as the overall strategic planning body will require accurate, well-coordinated national intelligence.
- c. Intelligence estimates will be required for post-war planning.

3. Discussion:

a. In wartime the luxury of long deliberation on national intelligence will not be permitted. Expeditionary handling of the interagency coordination of intelligence production creates certain problems not now extant. For example, if Washington must be evacuated and the Government operated from relocation centers, the distance between centers will constitute a hazard not now existing.

b. The present mechanism for production of national intelligence might be streamlined in several ways to meet wartime requirements, e.g., by stationing IAC agency liaison officers with the Board of National Estimates, with certain powers to act for their principals; coordinating

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in large measure by cable, secure telephone or teletype; and producing briefer estimates which could more easily be transmitted by cable.

c. Each agency has responsibility for planning of wartime operation, but the over-all intelligence production planning is statutorily the responsibility of the DCI with the advice and guidance of the IAC.

4. Conclusions:

a. The problems associated with wartime intelligence production need to be identified.

b. Operation Alert 1956 could be used to test solutions of some of the identified problems.

5. Recommendations:

a. That the IAC appoint an ad hoc Working Group, under the chairmanship of CIA, to identify the problems associated with wartime production of national intelligence.

b. That the Working Group submit its report to the IAC by 20 April 1956 so that plans can be made for testing solutions to certain of the problems during Operation Alert 1956.

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